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Abstract
Fertilizer subsidies are again part of the policy agenda in Sub-Saharan Africa since
the 1990s. Governments spend large shares of their agricultural budgets and their
means to fight poverty on such programmes, but economists formulated doubts
whether these investments will pay off. This paper reviews the existing literature
on effects of fertilizer subsidies in Zambia, presents an analytical framework on
input subsidies and compares the empirical evidence to the goals of the fertilizer
subsidy. Major findings are that the subsidy programme has failed to substantially
reduce poverty and to improve food security via decreased maize prices. Farm
incomes have increased moderately, but the overall costs exceed the benefits by
far. Reasons for this are identified as poor targeting, diversion and leakage. The
paper concludes with a review of policy recommendations, mainly focussed on
improved targeting and diversification away from pure fertilizer subsidies.
Introduction
Although many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have gone through reform
processes towards market liberalisation in their agricultural policies, fertilizer sub-
sidy policies are again part of the policy agenda of countries like Malawi, Kenya,
Mali and Zambia. While governments and donors in SSA regard input subsidies
in the 1960s and 70s as a mean to boost agricultural production, inspired by the
Green Revolution in Asia, a mind-shift took place in the 1980s as subsidies were
found to be ineffective and causing financial and political problems (Crawford et
al. 2003). Despite market liberalization efforts and withdrawal of governmental
intervention, comprehensive entry of private input dealers did hardly take place
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(Crawford et al. 2003). Nevertheless, there are several reasons for the new pop-
ularity of fertilizer subsidies: the understanding that fertilizer use is crucial for
national food security, the food price crisis in 2007/08, the public visibility of sub-
sidy policies and the easier financing opportunities due to donor support (Kelly et
al. 2011). In Zambia, fertilizer subsidies play a major role in input subsidy pro-
grammes, such as the Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP). Input subsidy
programmes have grown significantly in physical and monetary volume over the
last decade (see table 1), which leads to the question of its efficiency.
Prior to analyzing existing fertilizer subsidy programmes it is important to recog-
nize their institutional character in Zambian society. Although marketing boards
were abolished within the structural adjustment programmes in the early 1990s,
Jayne (2008) argues that input subsidies are part of the social contract of Zambian
society which makes their abolishment or replacement difficult. This contract in-
cludes low urban consumer prices for maize and sufficient producer prices for
farmers. Subsidies are also an ambivalent political tool: on the one hand input
subsidies are visible policies that promise constituency and, on the other hand,
contain political risks for the ruling party if they are abolished (Jayne 2008). Ef-
forts to seek different ways than the path of input subsidies in the first half of
the 1990s have soon been replaced by the known support policies (for details see
Minde et al. (2008)).
The purpose of this paper is to present important findings of the existing literat-
ure on fertilizer subsidies in Zambia and to discuss them critically while espe-
cially considering to which extent the current subsidy programmes have achieved
their goals. Subsequently the FISP, the currently largest agricultural subsidy pro-
gramme in Zambia, will be shortly described and its goals will be outlined. This
is followed by a theoretical account of input subsidies and their effects on markets
and efficiency. Finally, the major contributions of existing literature to this issue
will be reported, eventually discussing adjustment possibilities for policy.
Farmer Input Support Programme (FISP)
FISP is the 2009/10 established successor of the Fertilizer Support Program (FSP)
which has been in place since 2002/03 in Zambia (both will be referred to as FISP
in the following, as differences are marginal). According to the Zambian Ministry
of Agriculture and Conservation (MACO) goals of FSP as well as FISP have been
and still are 1) the improvement of household and national food security, 2) the
improvement of incomes for smallholders, 3) to grant them access to input and
simultaneously 4) to regenerate their resource base and 5) to enable the private
sector to supply farm inputs (MACO 2008). Mason et al. (2013) find that 6)
poverty reduction is an implicit goal of the programme due to demanding about
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Table 1: FISP expenditures, beneficiaries and fertilizer consumption
Year FSP /
FISP
(billion
ZMK)
FSPP as
% of
FISP
Number
of benefi-
ciaries
Actual
benefi-
ciaries as
% of
intended
benefi-
ciaries
Fertilizer
delivered
(MT)
FISP
fertilizer
as % of
total
fertilizer
con-
sumption
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6
2002 17.79 168.5 – – 28,985 19.2
2003 50.00 8.0 102,113 85.1 48,000 29.0
2004 98.05 30.7 101,139 67.4 60,000 26.3
2005 139.99 14.9 64,854 56.4 46,000 32.5
2006 184.05 8.8 74,040 59.2 50,000 31.1
2007 204.54 5.2 164,229 78.2 84,000 41.9
2008 492.08 2.0 140,612 112.5 50,000 42.6
2009 565.12 1.8 192,860 96.4 80,000 39.8
2010 589.01 1.7 292,685 58.5 100,000 44.8
2011 895.39 1.7 430,141 48.3 178,000 47.6
2012 500.00 5.0 422,393 46.2 182,454 62.1
2013 499.97 – – – 183,634 51.1
Source: table adjusted according to Mason et al. (2013), column 6: author’s calculations
according to ibid. and FAOSTAT (n. d.).
Notes: ZMK (Zambian kwacha) nominal. 2012 and 2013 according to budgeting. FSP =
Fertilizer Support Programme, FISP = Farmer Input Support Programme, FSPP = Food
Security Package Programme. Columns 3 - 6 referring to agricultural year. 2009/10:
fertilizer pack size halved.
half the agricultural sector Poverty Reduction Programme’s (PRP) means. Few
companies were assigned by the government to import fertilizer.
Mason et al. (2013) have lined out participation conditions for farmers. Anyone
interested in participation has to be member of eligible cooperatives or farmer
groups and can then be selected by cooperative boards, official extension officers
and local leaders. Farmers need to have the capacities to grow between 0.5 and
5 hectares of maize, they need to be able to pay the respective farmer share of
the input deliveries and may not participate in the Food Security Pack Programme
(FSPP). The FSPP is a diverse subsidy programme designed to support very poor
and socially disadvantaged smallholders, but it accounts for less than 5 % of the
spendings compared to FISP (see table 1).
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Input subsidies in theory
In theory, input subsidies affect equilibria on farms, input markets and output
markets, assuming perfect competition. On input markets (figure 1a) a per unit
consumer subsidy results in an increased input quantity demanded by farmers.
Compared to the market equilibrium P0/Q0 a decrease in consumer prices to PC
(farmer purchasing price) and an increase in producer prices OP (retailer price)
occurs. The difference between PC and PP is the height of the subsidy. It is as-
sumed that farmers purchase their fertilizer from local retailers and do not import
directly. Thus, the input market can be interpreted as the market where domestic
private dealers and farmers meet. Given this, due to the increased quantity deman-
ded, an incentive to enter the input retailing market is provided by the subsidy.
The new price PC at which inputs are purchased now results in lower marginal
costs (MC). As shown in figure 1b the farm’s cost curve for the respective input
becomes flatter as inputs can be acquired more cheaply. In optimum, the farm
employs an input quantity q where MC equals the marginal revenue (MR). The
initial level of input is q0 with revenue R0. As the cost curve shifts from C0 to
C1 the optimum quantity increases to q1, while the new optimum revenue is R1.
Therefore, an input subsidy increases the optimum input quantity employed and
the farm’s outputs.
The decrease in MC also affects output markets, exemplary shown in figure 1c.
Figure 1: Farm and market reactions to input subsidies
(a) Input markets (b) Farm level (c) Output markets
Source: Author’s illustrations
Notes: R = reveneue, C = costs for input, PP = producer price, PC = consumer price, PW
= world market price.
An input subsidy would cause the supply curve S0 to rotate rightwards to S1.
Assuming an importing country with negligible market volume compared to the
world market, the quantity imported would decrease as the domestic production
quantity rises from QS1 to QS2. As QD remains unchanged, the quantity imported
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decreases.
The governmental intervention results in changes in overall welfare, as depicted in
table 2. Welfare analysis indicates that governmental expenditures (GE) are larger
Table 2: Welfare effects of an input subsidy
Market ∆ GE ∆ PS ∆ CS DWL
Input -(a + b + c + d + e + f) + a + b + d + e + f -c
Output -(b + f + g) + f 0 - (b + g)
Source: Author’s table
Notes: GE = Government Expenditures, PS = Producer Surplus, CS = Consumer Surplus,
DWL = Dead-weight Loss. Input markets: PS refers to retailers, CS to farmers. Output
markets: PS refers to farmers, CS to end-consumer.
than the gains for the respective producers and consumers on both markets, which
results in a dead-weight loss (DWL). Note that the height of GE is necessarily
the same on both markets. On input markets, changes in producer surplus (PS)
and consumer surplus (CS) are both positive, making retailers and farmers both
benefit from the subsidy. The market side with the more inelastic price elasticity
is benefiting more from the subsidy programme. Farmers benefit from low costs
and higher outputs while input retailers are likely to gain from increased demand.
Therefore, arguments that input subsidies kick-start retailer markets may hold ac-
cording to welfare analysis.
Similarly, changes in output markets due to governmental intervention also res-
ult in substantial welfare losses, as GE exceed the increases in PS (farmers), and
CS (end-consumers) remains constant. Due to the assumption of a small import-
ing country, CS is not changed, unless the subsidy does not allow for the country
becoming an exporter.1 This means an input subsidy does not have an effect on
the well-being of food consumers, in theory. Hence, if food security for urban
consumers shall be achieved, according to goal no. 1, low consumer prices can-
not be expected to be an outcome. Nevertheless, the country is subsequently less
dependent on imports which could be an implicit policy goal with respect to na-
tional food security. Producers profit from the subsidy, gaining welfare from an
increased quantity produced.
These theoretical deliberations on direct effects of input subsidies predict an in-
crease in input usage and farm output while imports decrease due to increased
domestic supply. In line with goal no. 2, farm incomes could be incresed with
possible subsequent effects on rural poverty (goals 2 and 6). Improvements for
1If a closed economy is assumed, CS is positive but PS depends on the price elasticity of
demand, surplus or loss both being possible. This may hold in domestic remote areas isolated
from the world market but having access to the subsidy.
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input dealers are possible according to the above assumption, which includes the
possibility of beneficial effects on the rural non-farm economy, referring to goal
no. 5. Despite the positive effects increased use of inputs, especially fertilizers,
may have on soil fertility, overuse can also cause environmental damage, not al-
lowing for sound predictions concerning goal no. 4. The severeness of envir-
onmental externalities caused by input subsidies is increasing with the factor’s
elasticities of demand and supply (Gerson and Feng 2013). Finally, welfare ana-
lysis clearly indicates substantial dead-weight losses which brings up the question
whether governmental expenditures could be better allocated to other investments
than input subsidies.
Method and data
The method employed in this paper is a literature review with previous systematic
keyword search. The majority of studies quoted here rely on various farm-level
panel surveys between 1999 and 2008, which serve as basis for descriptive ana-
lysis and econometric modelling. Most important are the Crop Forecast Survey
and the Post-Harvest Survey, as well as the three Supplemental Surveys, jointly
conducted by the Zambian Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAL) and the
Central Statistical Office (CSO) (compare Xu et al. (2009), Mason et al. (2013),
Minde et al. (2008)). These are complemented by the cross-sectional Rural Agri-
cultural Livelihoods Surveys (compare Mason and Tembo 2015) and various other
national data sources, such as MACO, MAL and CSO (compare Ricker-Gilbert et
al. 2013).
Empirical evidence
Fertilizer use and markets
Table 1 shows that the amount of fertilizer distributed has multiplied from FISP’s
implementation in 2002/03 until 2013. Similarly, the number of beneficiaries has
roughly quadrupled in the same period, although the halving of fertilizer pack size
to 100 kg per beneficiary throughout 2009/10 is noteworthy. Column 6 depicts
the importance of FISP, as its delivered fertilizer amount has at least accounted
for nearly 30 % of total national fertilizer consumption since 2006. Mason and
Jayne (2013) have estimated an increase in total fertilizer use of 0.54 kg per kg
subsidized fertilizer, on average, accounting for crowding-out (i. e. the reduction
of private fertilizer sales to farmers due to the subsidy) and diversion (i. e. the pro-
portion of fertilizer which is is purchased by the government but is not distributed
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to the intentional governmental channels)2. The authors estimate, for instance, an
incremental national fertilizer use of 45,360 MT for 2006/07 and 96,120 MT for
2010/11, respectively.
The incremental use of fertilizer per unit subsidized fertilizer is differing over
across smallholders. Poorer smallholders apply an additional 0.66 tons fertilizer
to their fields while richer households only apply 0.56 tons (Minde et al. 2008).
This indicates a differing crowding out rate of private sector input dealers along
the wealth distribution of smallholders. This is explained by estimated 80 % of
poor smallholders do not have financial means to purchase from private dealers,
leading to high application rates (ibid.).
Maize production and prices
Mason et al. (2013) have examined farmer’s responses in production patterns to
the subsidy. They find an ceteris paribus increase of output of 1.88 kg maize per
kg subsidized fertilizer, which is in similar a similar range as compared to 1.65
kg maize in Malawi (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne 2011) and considered as relatively
small. The authors constitute this small effect with late delivery of fertilizers on
the one hand (ibid.) and Zambia’s wide-spread acid soils, which limit yield re-
sponse rates to basal dressing fertilization (Burke et al. 2012b). Further evidence
for the rather small positive effect of FISP on maize prodcution is that only 15 %
of Zambia’s 2011 record harvest could be accredited to increased fertilizer use,
while 42 % must be attributed to favourable weather conditions (Mason et al.
2011).
The effects on maize prices are marginal. Ricker-Gilbert et al. (2013) found that
doubling the amount of subsidized fertilizer distributed would decrease real maize
prices between 1.8 % and 2.4 %. The analysis shows similar effects for Malawi,
where a doubling results in a reduction of real maize prices between 1.2 % and
1.6 %.
Targeting
Scientists have examined access and allocation of subsidized fertilizer with re-
spect to socio-economic HH characteristics, shortly referred to as targeting. As
shown in table 1, although FISP has experienced an enormous rise in participa-
tion, it has often lagged behind its aspirations regarding the number of intended
beneficiaries. For example, the programme had 422,393 members in 2012, four
times the amount of 2003, but with 46.2 % it did not reach half of its intended
benefit recipients.
2The authors call this phenomenon leakage in the original study. This paper follws Jayne
et al. (2013), using the term diversion differently from leakage (resale of subsidized fertilizer or
vouchers on village level)
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Literature shows that the FISP participation condition of being able to cultivate
more than 0.5 ha maize works effectively as entrance barrier for smallholders.
Burke et al. (2012) estimate that this formal requirement has excluded roughly
15 % - 20 % of national farms in advance, Mason et al. (2013) calculate with
17 %. Weber (2008) (as cited in Minde et al. (2008)) assumed 40 % of national
farms exluded from participation in FSP (threshold in FSP: 1 ha). Further en-
trance barriers are said to be large cash outlays necessary for becoming member
of farmer cooperatives and the unability of smallholders to afford the farmer’s
share of purchasing the subsidized fertilizer packages (Burke et al. (2012), Mason
et al. (2013)).
Examining the distribution of subsidized fertilizer under smallholder farmers (0 -
20 ha), Minde et al. (2008) find wealthier farmers in terms of landholdings and
assets to receive more subsidized fertilizer (compare table 3). Mason et al. (2013)
confirm this, arguing that smallholder farmers with more farm and non-farm assets
are more likely to participate in FISP and, if doing so, they receive more fertilzer.
Another important aspect of targeting is the spatial proximity of farms to main
roads or towns: remote farms are less likely to benefit from FISP (Mason et al.
2013a).
These findings are in line with the Zambian government’s targeting goals: ”The
government‘s stated rationale for targeting the more capitalized farmers was that
they would use fertilizer more efficiently than smaller farms and contribute more
to national maize supplies.” (Minde et al. 2008, p. 12). As given in table 3 (col.
7 - 9), wealthier farms are more likely to sell maize and they sell more. Some
studies therefore suppose that Zambia’s government tries to reduce poverty by
reducing maize prices through increasing supply by targeting wealthier farms, of-
ten referred to as vulnerable but viable (Mason et al. (2013), Ricker-Gilbert et al.
(2013)). As shown above, it is questionable that this argument holds.
Col. 10 in table 3 shows the average products according to farm sizes, proving
small farms with less than 1 ha being able to generate the highest maize output of
3.73 per kg fertilizer. This could be an incentive to redirect fertilizer to these farm-
ers, resulting in a more efficient use of fertilizer and possible effects on poverty
(Burke et al. 2012a). Currently, 15.5 % of FISP fertilizer is distributed to farms
with less than 1 ha, accounting for 40.6 % of smallholder households (compare
col. 1 and 6, table 3).
Poverty Reduction
To answer whether fertilizer subsidizing policies can reduce poverty efficiently
although they are biased in their targeting, literature provides two different lines
of reasoning. First, some authors argue that FSP/FISP contribution is negilible as
poverty has not substantially decreased during the last decades, despite the enor-
muous expenditures for the programmes and its physical amplification, letting
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poverty rates only decline from 80 % to 78 % since 2004 (Jayne et al. (2011),
Mason et al. (2013)).
Mason and Tembo (2015), on the other hand, argue that the causality aspect is
not considered in the statement above and ask how poverty incidence and severity
would change if the subsidy programmes had not been in place, referring to the
Foster-Greer-Thorbecke method (see Foster et al. 1984). They estimate that an
additional 200 kg FISP fertilizer (pack size) increases ceteris paribus the average
total household income by 7.7 % by improving crop income (non-crop income
sources are not affected), on average. Although the probability to fall below the
US$ 2.00 poverty threshold or the US$ 1.25 extreme poverty threshold, respect-
ively, is not influenced by the FISP fertilizer component according to the authors,
an additional 200 kg FISP fertilizer pack slightly reduces poverty severity by 2.7
% or 3.6 % for extreme poverty, respectively. So, this study suggests that although
household incomes improve moderately, the effect on poverty reduction is small,
if existent at all. In comparison, the current FISP pack size of subsidized hy-
brid maize seed (10 kg) improves farm incomes by 1.1 % while reducing poverty
severity by 0.7 % (Mason and Smale 2013).
Eventually, descriptive as well as econometric studies suggest that fertilizer sub-
sidies contribute only little to poverty reduction. This hints at a disparicy between
the large share of FISP on PRP and the comparably small effect on poverty.
Discussion: Have the goals been achieved?
The previous section has quoted the results of several studies with respect to fertil-
izer use, summarized as follows: FISP has increased maize production, although
this effect is rather small. Crowding out and leakage have significantly reduced the
efficiency of the subsidy, leading to an estimated third of FISP fertilizer was not
allocated to intended beneficiaries. Subsidy efficiency is simultaneously dwarfed
due to logistical problems in fertilizer distribution leading to delayed delivery
and difficult agro-ecological conditions. Accordingly, decreases in retailer maize
prices are marginal.
Assuming poor farm households being net food buyers (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne
2011), the effect of the subsidy on rural and urban food security can be considered
as not satisfying, with respect to goal no. 1. On the other hand, as productiv-
ity of smallholders raised slightly, local effects on food supply may be existent.
Although the overall effects are small, especially compared to claims on the pro-
gramme’s outcomes, it is necessary to acknowledge that even small reductions
in maize prices can improve the situation of the rural poor (Ricker-Gilbert et al.
2013).
9
Table 3: Farm size distribution, poverty rates, FISP fertilizer distribution, maize selling and average fertilizer product com-
pared by total area cultivated
Area
cultiv-
ated by
farm in
ha
% of
small-
holder
HH
% of all
small-
holder
HH
below
poverty
line
Poverty
rate in
group
% of
HH in
group
receiv-
ing
FISP
fertil-
izer
Mean
kg FISP
fertil-
izer
received
by
benefi-
ciary
% of
total
FISP
fertil-
izer
received
% of
HH in
group
selling
maize
Mean
kg
maize
sold per
selling
HH
% of
total
sold
maize
Average
product
of fertil-
izer (kg
maize
per kg
fertil-
izer)
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 - 0.49 17.0 17.7 78.4 7.2 161 2.5 12.1 440 0.9
3.73
0.5-0.99 23.6 26.0 83.2 22.5 190 13.0 29.8 763 5.2
1 - 1.99 31.9 34.1 80.6 32.1 225 297 48.2 1,203 18.0 3.48
2 - 4.99 23.5 20.5 65.8 47.2 286 41.0 66.3 2,620 39.7 3.52
5 - 9.99 3.3 1.7 37.9 54.5 458 10.7 83.6 7,975 21,5 3.68
10 - 20 0.6 0.1 14.8 50.0 766 3.2 98.2 23,937 14.7 3.46
Total 100 100 75.5* 30.0* 259* 100 43.5* 2,368* 100 —
Source: table adjusted according to Mason et al. (2013) and Burke et al. (2012) as cited in Mason et al. (2013). (column 10)
Notes: *) weighted mean of column, rest column sum. 1,417,992 smallholder HHs in total. Data from 2010/11 agricultural year.
Cultivated area excl. fallow. Column 2 and 3: poverty line according to US$ 1.25 poverty threshold. Column 10: referring to agricultural
year 2006/07 incl. fallow.
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Despite the subsidy’s relative positive impact on smallholder incomes (+ 7.7 %)
is larger than the relative effects on maize prices, the effects on poverty are com-
paredly small, as poverty severity is only reduced between 2.7 % and 3.6 % (Ma-
son and Tembo 2015). This can partly explain why poverty rates did not decrease,
although the amount of FISP fertilizer has increased substantially. Although farm
income (goal 2) has raised moderately, effects on poverty (goal 6) are negligible
as compared to FISP’s budget share in PRP.
The reason for FISP’s poor efficiency lies, among others, in its targeting. Many
studies quoted here have shown that there are significant entrance barriers for poor
farmers if they intend to participate in FISP. Roughly 70 % of smallholders cul-
tivate less than 2 ha land, roughly 40 % being below the US$ 1.25 poverty line
(compare table 3). Only 21 % of total FISP fertilizer is distributed to this group.
According to Mason et al. (2013), the rationale of Zambia’s subsidy programmes
FISP and FSPP has been the support of vulnerable but viable smallholder farm-
ers. Although this phrase is not explicitly defined, it suggests that major support
should be given to smallholders below the poverty line.
As shown above, the majority of FISP fertilizer is distributed to wealthier farm-
ers. FSPP is targeted to the poorest, but it is poorly equipped with financial means
compared to FISP or the number of potential beneficiaries. This may be a reason
for low poverty impacts of FISP. In order to improve maize production efficiently,
targeting should be revised according to the farm’s productivity, what includes a
redirection of means to the poorest smallholders. (Burke et al. 2012a). As FISP is
poorly targeted, access to input is not granted for all farmers and goal no. 3 only
partly achieved.
Targeting is also not satisfying due to diversion. In Zambia, 33 % of FISP fer-
tilizer does not reach the intended farms, but is probably traded in commercial
channels (Mason and Jayne 2013). Diversion is affecting crowding-out of private
retailers: they cannot compete with salesmen who have acquired their goods from
diverted fertilizer because it can be sold much cheaper on private markets (Jayne
et al. 2013). This system is probably stable as long as the subsidy is in place. Due
to this second marketing channel, the assumption of one fertilizer market made
above does not hold. The incentive for private input dealers to enter the market is
weakened. This tendency is enforced if only few private input dealers are involved
in fertilizer distribution, compared to the total number of input dealers (Xu et al.
2009).
Similarly, leakage can be a targeting problem, although literature does not provide
detailed insights to this topics. As fertilizer packs can be sold by recipients to non-
beneficiaries at higher prices than the subsidized price, it could be interesting for
farmers not to use fertilizer on their fields, especially when fertilizer is delivered
late.
Evidence on whether FISP can help smallholders to sustain their resource base
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(goal no. 4) has not been considered so far. Considering Zambia’s acidic soils,
Burke et al. (2012) argue that fertilizer subsidies can indeed play a role in increas-
ing soil fertility, if e. g. lime is applied. Nevertheless, lime is expensive compared
to other fertilizers and needs to be applied in far greater amount than for instance
nitrogen fertilizers. Therefore, the current subsidy programme has limited impact
on soil fertility.
On the other hand, Levine and Mason (2014) found that fertilizer subsidies crowd-
in soil fertility management measures, such as organic fertilizer application, crop
rotation and anti-erosion measures. Only the use of fallow land for fertility re-
generation is found to be declining, what conforms with Mason et al. (2013),
substantiating increased maize production being rooted in the reduction of fallow.
Ultimately, the discussed shortcomings of FISP result in benefit cost ratios (BCR)
(calculated for 2006/07 and 2010/11) between 0.37 and 0.76 with mean 0.52 for
Zambia, compared to similar mean BCRs of 0.52 for Kenya and 0.56 for Malawi
(Jayne et al. 2013). This proves the cost for fertilizer subsidies weigh out their
benefits by far, with similar results for other countries using fertilizer subsidy pro-
grammes.
Conclusion and Policy Recommendations
The present synthesis of literature on the results of Zambia’s FISP fertilizer sub-
sidies has summarized a variety of data. The depicted research provides insights
on the subsidy’s effects on fertilizer use, influence on maize production and re-
tailer prices, agro-ecological aspects as well as targeting and distribution issues.
The comparison with FISP’s stated goals yielded a divided picture. For one thing,
FISP has failed to achieve the goals for food security, access to input for small-
holders, poverty reduction and private sector boost in fertilizer retailing, at least
in parts. Otherwise, there have been improvements with respect to farm incomes
and soil conservation.
Many of the cited authors here call for substantial policy changes regarding FISP.
Burke et al. (2012) emphasize the importance of an increased yield response rate
through diversifying beyond fertilizer subsidies and considering findings of Zam-
bian agronomic research with respect to seed varieties coping with acidity, fer-
tilizer application methods and fertilizer components. Mason and Jayne (2013)
recommend improved targeting and the reduction of leakage by means of an
electronic voucher system or the redirection of financial means to the FSPP pro-
gramme. Mason et al. (2013) argue similarly, highlighting the positive effects on
poverty reduction by improved targeting of smallholders with between 0.5 ha and
2 ha land. Postulations to, inter alia, empower farmers, design fertilizer import
and distribution more polypolistic, to improve infrastructure and to revise target-
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ing goals and processes are formulated by Minde et al. (2008). Jayne et al. (2013)
insist on improved design and implementation, as well as fitting governance solu-
tions.
Interestingly, a study on fertilizer subsidies and voting patterns by Mason et al.
(2013) found biased distribution of subsidized fertilizer to the ruling party’s con-
stituency, but could not prove a correlation between election results and fertilizer
subsidies.
So, although some see subsidies in Zambia as an institution, there might be real-
istic opportunities to change the current system and make real progress towards
the programmes goals.
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